Re: [新聞] 台灣不如烏克蘭！美媒： 漢光演習像表演

原文
Taiwan’s Civil Society Is Not Ready for War
Ukraine’s civil society was well-prepared, psychologically and practically,
for Russia’s invasion. Taiwan’s is not.
https://thediplomat.com/2025/08/taiwans-civil-society-is-not-ready-for-war/

As the war in Ukraine grinds on and tensions rise in the Taiwan Strait,
comparisons between the two flashpoints have become common. But for all the
talk of parallels, one glaring lesson remains unheeded in Taipei: civil
society must be battle-ready before any conflict begins.

The slogan “Defending Ukraine is defending Taiwan” has gained traction among
international policy elites. With the return of U.S. President Donald Trump’s “America First” doctrine, the parallel between Taiwan and Ukraine has
become even more pronounced, as concerns over Ukraine’s potential abandonment by the U.S. have reignited and intensified the conversation. For many in
Taipei and Washington alike, Ukraine’s endurance in the face of Russian
aggression is seen as a metaphor for Taiwan’s future resilience. However,
this comparison, while compelling, overlooks the most pressing disparity:
Ukraine’s civil society was well-prepared. Taiwan’s is not.

Taiwan recently conducted its largest-ever Han Kuang exercises, which
stretched twice as long as usual and mobilized over 20,000 reservists in live-fire scenarios staged in everyday settings, from train stations to schoolyards. Children watched as smoke clouds and blank rounds filled the air. This year’s drills included unprecedented civilian-facing components, such as
emergency response simulations and cyberattack countermeasures. The message to Beijing and Washington was clear: “We are defending ourselves.” But is that
enough?

Despite these expanded exercises, Taiwanese civil defense remains, to some
extent, performative rather than structural – or the structural component
stays outside of the media cameras. Programs like Kuma Academy have begun to
raise awareness and offer civil defense training, but their reach remains
limited. Han Kuang exercises only began systematically integrating civilians
in 2025, three decades after they were first launched. And while reservist
training has expanded, ordinary citizens remain largely spectators rather than participants.

This reflects a deeper issue. Many Taiwanese still treat war as unthinkable.
Years of peace and prosperity have dulled the sense of urgency. Unlike
Ukrainians, who by late 2021 had begun to accept invasion as an inevitable
risk, many in Taiwan maintain psychological distance. A 2025 poll by NationalChengchi University showed that while more than 60 percent of respondents
identify as Taiwanese rather than Chinese, most prefer to maintain the statusquo over seeking formal independence. In Taiwan, identity is shaped more by
culture and lifestyle than existential political commitment.

Ukraine was different. After the 2014 Revolution of Dignity and Russia’s
annexation of Crimea, Ukrainian society mobilized from the bottom up.
Grandmothers knitted socks for strangers at the front. Villages sent food.
Volunteers formed territorial defense units and supply chains. By the time ofRussia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, that resilience had matured into a
hardened national defense network. Civilian readiness was an integral part ofdaily life. Ukrainian identity came to mean democracy, sovereignty, and
resistance to imperial domination.

In Taiwan, by contrast, civil-military integration remains weak. Public
interest in geopolitical threats is very often comparatively low. Many young
people are disengaged from debates on national security. Defense policy is
frequently left to the state and military establishment.

Taiwanese authorities have begun addressing this gap. But the scale is still
insufficient. Taiwan’s “baby steps” toward resilience remain tentative and
lack clear direction. Even recent conscription reforms – extending mandatory
service from four months to one year – appear to be reactive rather than
transformative. Civilian participation in the Han Kuang drills is only now
being introduced, and the delay speaks volumes.

Meanwhile, China has been preparing its society for decades. Through patriotic education, ideological discipline, and social control mechanisms, Beijing has cultivated a population conditioned to support the state in conflict. Taiwan’s strategy has been the opposite: depoliticize, demilitarize, and hope for
deterrence through foreign alignment. The discrepancy could be catastrophic.

Security guarantees are not security strategies. Ukraine learned this with the failure of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. When the invasion came,
international support was crucial – but insufficient without internal
resilience. Taiwan risks a similar fate. Its defense posture relies heavily on U.S. backing under the Taiwan Relations Act, yet in a crisis, external help
could be delayed or constrained by legal ambiguity, political division, or
fear of escalation with China. Moreover, to receive American aid, Taiwan mustdemonstrate its readiness to resist, as the U.S. will not come to save those
who don’t want to fight for themselves. Even in the event of a robust U.S.
response, it would take time – something Taipei might not have.

China’s likely strategy for taking Taiwan would be a swift and overwhelming
assault, aimed at preventing foreign intervention and minimizing civilian
resistance. It may not be framed as a war, but rather as a “quarantine,” “
peacekeeping operation,” or a “domestic stabilization campaign.” Taipei may
have only hours to respond. Without a mobilized population, no volume of
imported hardware will be enough.

Even Taiwan’s recent drills, despite their expanded scope, underscore the
problem. Civilian-facing exercises may look impressive, but they remain
isolated and symbolic. Watching blank rounds fired in a train station doesn’t prepare civilians to act. Unless these gestures evolve into a national civicmobilization strategy, the island remains vulnerable.

Despite dramatic headlines and regular military provocations, Taiwan must
fully absorb the lessons of Ukraine. The comparison may be imperfect, but thewarning is unmistakable: war may not come tomorrow – or ever – but in Xi
Jinping’s era, national rejuvenation and “reunification” remain core
objectives of the Chinese Communist Party.

以下是機翻
台灣的公民社會尚未準備好迎戰

烏克蘭的公民社會在心理與實際層面上都對俄羅斯的入侵做了充分準備，而台灣則尚未如此。

隨著烏克蘭戰爭持續進行、台海緊張局勢升高，兩者之間的比較越來越常見。但儘管有如此多的相似論述，台北仍忽視了一個明顯的教訓：公民社會必須在戰爭爆發前就做好戰鬥準備。

「保衛烏克蘭就是保衛台灣」這句口號，在國際政策圈內廣為流傳。隨著美國總統川普的「美國優先」政策回歸，人們更加擔心美國會拋棄烏克蘭，這也讓烏克蘭與台灣的命運更加受到關注。對台北與華府許多人來說，烏克蘭在俄國侵略下的韌性，是台灣未來堅韌抵抗的象徵。然而，這種比喻雖然吸引人，卻忽略了最關鍵的差異：烏克蘭的公民社會已充分準備，而台灣的沒有。

台灣最近舉行了史上最大規模的「漢光演習」，時間延長為以往兩倍，超過兩萬名後備軍人參與，實兵演練甚至進行到車站、校園等日常場域。孩童親眼目睹煙霧瀰漫、空包彈四射。此次演習首度納入民間面向的內容，如緊急應變與網攻防禦演練。對北京與華府的訊息很明確：「我們正在自我防衛。」但，這夠了嗎？

儘管演習規模擴大，台灣的民防仍帶有表演性質，缺乏制度性支撐——或者說制度性內容
未對外公開。像「黑熊學院」這類民間課程雖已開始提升意識、提供訓練，但覆蓋範圍有限。漢光演習直到2025年才開始系統性納入民眾參與，而一般人仍多是旁觀者，而非實際參與者。

這反映出更深層的問題：許多台灣人仍將戰爭視為不可想像之事。 長期和平與繁榮削弱了緊迫感。與烏克蘭不同的是，2021年底之前，烏克蘭人已逐漸接受「戰爭可能」的現實；但台灣民眾仍保持心理距離。2025年政治大學的一項調查指出，雖然超過六成受訪者自認是「台灣人」而非「中國人」，但多數人仍希望維持現狀，而非追求法理獨立。台灣的認同更多源於文化與生活方式，而非存亡決心。

烏克蘭的情況不同。自2014年尊嚴革命與克里米亞被吞併以來，烏克蘭社會從基層開始動員。祖母為前線士兵織襪子、村莊送糧、志工組成領土防衛部隊與供應鏈。到了2022年全面入侵時，這些已形成堅強的國防網絡，民間韌性已融入日常。烏克蘭身分象徵著民主、主權與對抗帝國壓迫的抵抗。

相比之下，台灣的文武整合仍相當薄弱。民眾對地緣政治威脅的關注度普遍偏低。許多年輕人對國安議題缺乏興趣，國防政策多由國家與軍方主導。

當局雖已開始補救，但規模仍遠遠不夠。台灣走向韌性的腳步仍猶豫、缺乏方向。即使是義務役改革——由4個月延長至1年——看起來也更像是「反應性調整」而非「戰略轉型」
。至於民眾參與漢光演習的制度，才剛剛啟動，其延遲本身即說明了一切。

與此同時，中國早已展開長期準備。透過愛國教育、意識形態管控與社會監控，北京已培養出一個能在戰爭中支持國家的社會。台灣的策略則相反：去政治化、非軍事化，並寄望靠對外結盟威懾中國。這種差距，可能造成災難。

安全承諾≠安全策略。 烏克蘭早已體會這點——1994年《布達佩斯備忘錄》最終失敗。
入侵發生時，國際援助雖然重要，但若沒有內部韌性仍不夠。台灣也面臨類似風險。目前防衛策略仰賴《台灣關係法》下的美國支持，但一旦發生衝突，外援可能因法律模糊、政治分歧或避免與中共升級對抗而延遲。要讓美國協助，台灣必須展現出自我防衛的意志——美國不會拯救一個不願為自己奮戰的夥伴。 即便美方反應快速，也需時間——而台北
可能等不到。

中國若攻台，最可能的戰術就是快速且壓倒性的突襲，目的是阻止外國介入、削弱民眾抵抗。其行動也不一定被稱作「戰爭」，而可能包裝為「隔離」、「維穩」或「和平任務」。台北的反應時間可能只有幾小時。若人民未動員，再多的軍購也救不了台灣。

即使台灣最近的軍演規模已擴大，問題依舊明顯。演習雖有民間元素，卻仍是孤立的象徵性活動。站在車站看空包彈發射，不代表你已準備好在戰時行動。若這些舉措無法進化為全面的國民動員計畫，台灣依舊脆弱。

儘管報導聳動、軍機繞台頻繁，台灣仍必須徹底吸取烏克蘭的教訓。這兩者未必完全可比，但警訊明確：也許戰爭永遠不會來，也許明天就會來，但在習近平的時代，「民族復興」與「統一」仍是中國共產黨的核心目標。

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