Re: [閒聊] 戰史教授談研究戰史的初學者/學生

我看的是英文版的《會戰成癮》（The Allure of Battle），我覺得helldog
你的解讀和原文不太一樣，似乎是在斷章取義。你駁斥作者是如何偏頗無知，
你的見解是如何如何，但是卻沒有把作者原本的想法好好呈現出來。

舉例來說，helldog你駁斥《會戰成癮》的作者，說他輕視德軍的突破戰術，
卻不知道協約國的戰術成功，是靠更多的資源，和偵察機反砲兵云云：

: 比如他把stormtrooper戰術批評的一文不值，卻大大稱讚英國的SS143手冊
: (英國版的stormtrooper戰術)，他大力稱讚協約國坦克戰術的成功，
: 但資深一點的軍迷都知道，一戰的坦克工藝還不夠成熟，自己拋錨的機率
: 還遠高於被敵人擊毀，協約國的戰術成功與其說是坦克戰術，還不如說
: 協約國有更多的砲兵、更多的砲彈、還有自己版本的滲透戰術；
: 砲擊終於能摧毀德軍前線，還能把彈幕滾動到摧毀德國砲兵，
: 因為反砲兵技術有大突破；透過偵察機與對砲火火光的觀察，
: 找出敵軍砲兵的位置，而德國人只能聽音辨位；
: 滲透戰術讓步兵能用較小的代價拿下佔領陣地。

作者在《會戰成癮》第12章的原文提到：

Heading into the final offensives of 1918, the British Army
developed innovative small unit tactics that employed enhanced
firepower with Lewis guns, rifle grenades and mortars.
This allowed platoon-sized units to fight their way ahead,
supported where possible by armored cars and lighter and
faster Whippet tanks.

......

On the other hand, the Germans had an offensive system
developed by, and informally named for, General Oskar von
Hutier. His infiltration tactics were developed on the
Eastern Front, then brought to the Western Front in 1918.
They rejected Allied-style frontal assaults after long
artillery preparation in favor of shorter bombardments and
attacks led by Sturmtruppen (“assault troops”). Instead of
rifles, elite lead infantry used close-assault weapons
(grenades, flamethrowers, pistols) to infiltrate through,
rather than try to storm over, opposing trenches. They bypassed
strongpoints under orders to maintain momentum of attack,
pressing deep into rear positions to sow panic and confusion,
and to disrupt communications and delay reinforcement.
They left heavy bunkers and machine gun nests behind for the
regular infantry that followed to isolate and take care of.
These assault tactics proved quite successful,
but they were not enough.

By 1918 everyone knew how to break through enemy trenches,
whether by Hutier tactics, innovative British Army small unit
tactics or French combined arms assaults with tanks and
aircraft. The key difference was that Allied armies and
generals now had the numbers and resources to make their
technological innovations and tactical systems work on
a war-winning and not just battle-winning scale.
Germans did not.

到了1918年的最後攻勢時，英國陸軍開發了創新的小部隊戰術，使用
路易士機槍、槍榴彈和迫擊砲，以增強火力。這樣讓排級單位能夠在
裝甲車和輕快的小靈犬坦克支援下向前推進。……

另一方面，德國人擁有由奧斯卡·馮·胡蒂爾將軍開發，並以他的名字
非正式命名的進攻系統。他的滲透戰術是在東線發展出來，1918年被
引入西線。這些戰術摒棄了像盟軍在長時間砲火準備之下的正面攻擊，
轉而採用短促的砲擊和突擊部隊（Sturmtruppen）率領的進攻。精銳
的步兵先鋒進攻時，使用近戰突擊武器（手榴彈、火燄噴射器、手槍）
取代步槍，滲透敵方戰壕，而非直接猛衝。他們奉命繞過堅固據點，
保持衝擊力，深入後方陣地，製造恐慌和混亂，擾亂通訊，拖延增援。
他們放過重型掩體和機槍陣地，讓隨後跟進的一般步兵去孤立和解決。
事實證明，這些突擊戰術非常成功，卻還是不夠。

1918年時，每個人都知道如何突破敵人的戰壕，無論是用胡蒂爾戰術、
英國陸軍創新的小部隊戰術，還是法國使用坦克和飛機進行聯合攻擊。
關鍵區別在於，協約國將領現在擁有足夠的數量和資源，可以讓他們
的技術創新和戰術系統在戰爭中發揮作用，而不僅僅是在戰鬥中取勝。
德國人卻沒有。

可以看到作者不像helldog你所說的「把stormtrooper戰術批評的一文不值」，
反而稱讚『這些突擊戰術非常成功』，也沒有「大大稱讚英國的SS143手冊」。
作者持平地敘述了各國發展的突破戰術，接著強調，突破戰術的最終關鍵，
還是在於協約國比起德國擁有更多的數量和資源。

實際上，作者這一小節的重點是在討論，德國於1917年時的軍工產能和技術
遠遠落後於協約國，在這樣的情勢下，雙方相對應的戰術發展與戰略變化，
協約國最終以消耗戰取得勝利，以及後續造成的種種影響。

作者也再三提到，一戰時空中力量的重要作用，是用偵察機為砲兵尋找目標
和引導砲擊：

Then it was realized that scout planes had advantages of
distant observation unequaled in the history of war as they
followed the retreating German armies, told Allied generals
exactly where they were, and guided in attacks and artillery.
...... Fixed-wing scouts soon became critical to all sides,
their cameras the keen eyes of the big guns, of mapmakers and
operations planners. ......

French air power, on the other hand, played a key role. Once
air superiority was established over the battlefield
the accuracy of massed artillery (nearly 3,000 French guns
by June) markedly improved. ......

In contrast, German corps lacked enough spotter aircraft
to properly coordinate even counterbattery fire, ......

...... while air superiority gave them advantages of
target-spotting and long-range indirect artillery fire. ......

接著人們意識到，偵察機的遠距離觀察優勢，在戰爭史上無可比擬，他們
可以追蹤撤退的德軍，告知協約國將領敵人的確切位置，並引導攻擊和砲擊。
……定翼偵察機很快成為各方面的關鍵，他們的相機成為重砲、地圖製作、
作戰規畫的敏銳目光。……

另一方面，法軍的空中力量則發揮了關鍵作用。當戰場上擁有空優時，
法軍大規模火砲（到6月時有將近3千門）的精準度就會顯著提升。……

相較之下，德軍缺乏足夠的偵察機，甚至無法妥善協調反砲兵火力……

……空優為他們提供了定位目標修正彈著，與長程間接砲擊的優勢。……

我覺得helldog你引用資料時，不應該老是用這種斷章取義的態度。

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你一堆斷章取義，沒有先把作者的論述好好說明，卻只顧著講你自己想講的。 舉另一個例子，作者以數千字篇幅，討論二戰德軍接受了納粹的種族主義， 造成許多殘酷行為，論述德軍這樣極端的軍事文化，影響納粹德國的失敗：

然而helldog你卻把作者的論述用兩句話帶過，調頭大談特談日軍佔領政策、 德國軍事教育，強調作者態度偏頗。但是你沒有針對作者的論述好好討論。

關於默茲河的橋樑是在第12章。作者在這一章的討論重點是一戰的消耗戰； 這一章的主要核心是凡爾登戰役的慘烈消耗，作者探討了德軍與法軍在此的 長期大規模消耗戰，對於雙方整體情勢的劇烈影響。許多內容是敘述戰役中 火砲的殺傷威力。而作者在這一章提到飛機效用的4個段落中，全部都提到了 飛機指引火砲的優勢，包含默茲河橋樑的段落也是如此： The key to French success at Verdun was resupply. Fresh corps, food and shells, fodder and horses, everything traveled the last 50 miles on a single-track railway or by light trucks on a narrow second-class road, though one quickly widened to handle more traffic. The internal combustion engine came of age and went to war at Verdun as trucks rolled night and day. At the height of the effort, 6,000 trucks and cars arrived at the terminus every 24 hours, or one every 14 seconds. Discipline was ruthlessly enforced on a no-stops lifeline French called the Voie Sacrée—the Holy Road. For ten months it was the pulsing jugular of the French Army: cut it and France would bleed to death. German air power proved not up to the job, as not one bridge over the Meuse was bombed, and the trucks and trains rolled on. Verdun was all about logistics. The Germans missed the point, and the bridges. French air power, on the other hand, played a key role. Once air superiority was established over the battlefield the accuracy of massed artillery (nearly 3,000 French guns by June) markedly improved. ...... 法軍在凡爾登的成功關鍵在於補給。增援部隊、糧食、砲彈、草料、馬匹， 所有的物資都要靠單線鐵路，或狹窄公路上的輕型卡車運送50英里到前線， 然而這條公路很快就拓寬，加強車輛通行能力。卡車不停地晝夜行駛，在 凡爾登戰場展現內燃機引擎的戰爭效用。到了戰役最激烈的關頭，每天有 6千輛卡車與汽車抵達，每14秒就有1輛。交通紀律無情地執行，讓法國人 稱為「神聖之路」的生命線毫不停歇。長達十個月，這一直是法軍的命脈： 切斷它，法軍會流血至死。但德軍空中力量無法達成任務，沒有任何一座 默茲河的橋樑被炸毀，卡車與汽車持續運補。凡爾登戰役的關鍵在於後勤， 德國人錯過這一點，也錯過了橋樑。另一方面，法軍的空中力量則發揮了 關鍵作用。當戰場上擁有空優時，法軍大規模火砲（到6月時有將近3千門） 的精準度就會顯著提升。…… 關於默茲河橋樑的段落，作者是引述自Paul Jankowski的《Verdun》，在該書 的第77頁，Jankowski討論當時的軍事空中力量尚處於起步階段，還無法大力 發展戰略轟炸，因而德軍對於凡爾登的後勤攻擊不足。 No one knew how to employ their fledgling air power or their lumbering long-range artillery to close down a 50-mile roadway or destroy the bridges across the Meuse. Shells landed on the road, and trucks were hit, but the 380 mm guns were inadequate in number and range to interdict such intense traffic on such a long stretch. Along its ditches over 8,000 men worked day and night to maintain it. German airships and fighter squadrons bombed the stations and cut the rail line and damaged the roads out of Verdun. But visibility was too poor and the loss rate too high to deflect them from the primary tasks of reconnaissance, artillery observation, and control of the air, and to allow the nascent science of strategic bombing to take flight. Of the 34 bridges over the Meuse, not one fell to bombs from the air. No one yet knew, in short, how to attack the enemy’s logistics instead of his defenses. 沒有人知道該如何運用他們剛剛起步的空中力量，或是笨重的長程砲火 來封鎖50英里的道路，或摧毀默茲河上的橋樑。砲彈擊中了道路和卡車， 但380公釐火砲的數量和射程不足，無法阻斷如此密集的交通。8千多人 日夜不停地工作，沿著壕溝來維修道路。德國飛艇和戰鬥機轟炸了車站， 切斷了鐵路，並破壞凡爾登的道路。但能見度太差，以及損失率太高， 他們忙於偵察、砲兵觀測、爭奪制空權，無法積極發展新興的戰略轟炸。 在默茲河上的34座橋樑，沒有任何一座是被空襲炸彈摧毀。簡而言之， 還沒有人知道該如何攻擊敵人的後勤而不是防禦。 於凡爾登戰役時，德軍或許應該運用更多空中力量來攻擊後勤，這樣的檢討， 參考Alistair Horne《The Price of Glory: Verdun 1916》第17章，可回溯 一戰時擔任無線電員與飛行員，參加了凡爾登戰役的Hans Ritter，於1926年 出版的《空戰》（Der luftkrieg），其中提到德軍當時擁有足夠的轟炸機， 但卻重複運用在砲兵火砲已經有效攻擊的鐵路樞紐上，而沒有更加重視攻擊 「神聖之路」，一舉削弱法軍的後勤。 What disruption carefully organised and constantly renewed bomb attacks would have wreaked upon this communications’ artery (i.e. the Voie Sacrée), crammed to the most extreme limits of its capacity, requires no details. Even after the first attacks numerous destroyed, burning vehicles would have blocked the road. Exploding munitions’ transports would have increased the confusion. Craters of heavy bombs would have cut the road in many places. A chaos that could not be disentangled must have arisen…. He goes on to point out that the Germans had standing by three squadrons of heavy ‘C-Machines’, seventy-two in number, each capable of dropping a 200-lb. bomb, which could reach their targets after half an hour’s flying. Thus twenty tons of explosives could have been rained down on the Voie Sacrée each day, not to mention demoralising night attacks. But for some extraordinary reason these bombers were wasted on attacking rail junctions that were already under effective artillery bombardment. 〔Hans Ritter〕這條已經過度飽和的交通要道（即「神聖之路」） 若遭到精心組織並持續轟炸的破壞，其嚴重程度不必贅述。首波襲擊後， 大量被摧毀的燃燒車輛將會堵住道路，運送的彈藥爆炸時會加劇混亂， 重型炸彈的彈坑會切斷多處道路，造成無法收拾的混亂。…… 他又指出，德軍有三個「Rumpler C」的中隊，共有72架，每架能搭載一枚 200磅的炸彈，半小時就能飛到目標上空。這樣一來，每天可以對神聖之路 　　投下20噸的炸彈，還能夜間襲擊，讓敵軍士氣更低落。但出於某些原因， 　　這些轟炸機被浪費在攻擊已遭到有效砲擊的鐵路交會樞紐上。