Re: [心得] 由系統面來看閃電戰

※ 引述《fw190a (las)》之銘言：
: 標題: Re: [心得] 由系統面來看閃電戰
: 時間: Wed Jan 22 12:28:23 2025
:
:
: https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA435929.pdf
: 你也承認內文就是來自翻譯這個，但說的有點不清楚吧。
: 然後也不是直譯與否問題，而是你就摘錄個別段落出來。
: 分別是開頭對閃電戰定義，和結尾的結論。
:
: 中間的東西支離破碎散掉，或加自己的料，
: 然後你要批評他常識?
:

我被迫在中間加料，因為它在作戰階層的部分寫得不好；你可以下一原文，原文對作戰階層的解釋如下:

creative use of distributed operations
for the purpose of strategy that are characterized by an ensemble of deep
maneuvers and distributed battles extended in space and time integrated in a
campaign unified by a common aim in retention or denial of freedom of action
punctuated by a period of inaction

作戰階層是分散作戰的創造性運用，旨在實現戰略目標，其特點是由一系列縱深機動和分散戰鬥所組成，這些行動在空間與時間上延展，並整合於一個統一目標的戰役之中——無
論是為了維持還是剝奪行動自由——並以階段性的停滯為特徵。

鬼知道分散作戰(distributed operations)是啥屁?然後又被迫去查啥叫分散作戰。

Distributed Operations (DO) is a warfighting concept developed by the United
States Marine Corps, primarily through their Warfighting Laboratory, in
response to the evolving environment of the Global War on Terror. The
emergence of adaptive enemies and a more complex operational landscape
necessitated that conventional forces retain the ability to decentralize
decision-making and distribute their forces effectively. The overarching goalof DO is to enhance a Marine Air-Ground Task Force commander's ability to
employ tactical units across the depth and breadth of a non-linear
battlespace.

所以我採用這個解釋，這個解釋也是我加在參考資料裡的

https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/November-December-2018/Blythe-Operational-Art/

Operational art is among the most noteworthy and controversial concepts in
modern military thought. Operational art emerged out of the Soviet Union
during the interwar era, and by the end of the twentieth century was an
integral component of the doctrine of the major military powers. The
theoretical construct of operational art combines characteristics of the
tactical and strategic levels of war while providing a linkage to make
tactical actions serve strategic ends. Operational art ensures this harmony
of effort by translating abstract strategic goals into mechanical terms that
commanders can then accomplish. In this way, operational art serves as the “
mediating, integrative synthesis standing between modern strategy and tactics” and “ensures that the arrangement of tactical actions is not random, but
more importantly, that the device that always and everywhere unites the
arrangement of tactical actions is the pursuit of the strategic objective,
not some other factor.”This article discusses the development of the concept
of operational art in the Soviet Union, its eventual adoption by the U.S.
Army, and contemporary debates about the utility of operational art.

作戰階層是現代軍事思想中最重要且最具爭議的概念之一。它起源於兩次世界大戰之間的蘇聯，並在二十世紀末成為主要軍事強權教義中的核心要素。作戰階層的理論架構結合了戰術與戰略層面的特徵，並建立起一條連結，使戰術行動能夠服務於戰略目標。作戰階層透過將抽象的戰略目標轉化為指揮官可以執行的具體行動，確保行動的一致性。如此一來，作戰階層成為「介於現代戰略與戰術之間的中介、整合性綜合體」，並且「確保戰術行動的安排不是隨機的，更重要的是，始終統一戰術行動安排的核心因素，是對戰略目標的追求，而非其他因素。」

然後你從原文的P25看到P30，你有看到任何閃電戰如何跟作戰階層關聯在一起的內容嗎?沒有。

比如第28頁:
Mechanization increased the depth and speed at which lethal and resilient
formations could operate, while the introduction of aircraft added a fourth
physical dimension to warfare.

These new combinations and dimensions required a commander to possess the
gift of vision—the ability to holistically design and execute campaigns. The
expansion of the battlespace necessitated that both the commander and his
staff possess this operational vision. They must be able to creatively
envision all actions within a theater of operations as a cohesive and
coherent pattern of activity, extended across space and time, yet unified by
a common objective. Similarly, the enemy must also possess an operational
mindset, being trained, armed, equipped, structured, and commanded in a
manner similar to the friendly forces.

機械化擴展了致命且持久作戰編隊的縱深和速度，而飛機的應用則為戰爭引入了第四個物理維度。

這些新的組合與維度要求指揮官具備遠見的能力，即全面設計和執行戰役的能力。戰場空間的擴展使指揮官及其參謀人員必須擁有這種作戰視野。他們需要能夠創造性地將作戰區內的所有行動視為一個整體且連貫的活動模式，該模式在空間和時間上延伸，並以共同目標為統一核心。

這一段話會讓人覺得，2戰誘發了作戰階層觀念的誕生，這個觀念是大錯特錯，德軍不是在2戰才把作戰階層納入他們的軍事，而是大家都是11路公車的1860~1914年，德軍就有作戰階層的概念了。

: : 比如德軍的共同願景是啥，但原文語焉不詳，對德軍的共同願景，也理解錯誤(德軍的: : 共同願景並不只是建立裝甲師)。
:
: The critical analysis instituted by General Von Seeckt and weekly articles: in the Militär-Wochenblatt ultimately led to the conceptual creation of
: the Panzer Division, a combined arms mechanized force capable of operating
: with the Luftwaffe.
:
: 他並沒有說德軍願景是建立裝甲師，而是說導致了裝甲師的誕生。

德軍的共同願景導致了裝甲師的誕生，你不覺得這樣的說法會讓讀者誤解為德軍的共同願景=誕生裝甲師?

:
: General Hans Von Seeckt clearly articulated that the goal of the German Army: was a return to movement in hopes of avoiding the stagnant trench warfare of: World War I.
:
: 德軍的共同願景簡單說就是，想透過運動戰，避免陷入一戰那種壕溝消耗戰。

原文寫馮.賽克特將軍(General Hans Von Seeckt)的願景是想透過運動戰，避免陷入一戰那種壕溝消耗戰，並不是寫德軍，請別扭曲原文。

就算原文不是這個意思，我也覺得他解釋的不夠清楚，所以我才加上德軍的共同願景=
在下一場戰爭中恢復機動戰，避免消耗戰。

: There was no way that Hitler’s Germany could defeat the force preponderance: of Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States.
: This had been as true in 1914 as it was in 1941.
:
: 這段是獨立的，但你自己加入和前段有所謂的"這導致"的關係。
:
: 因為你看不懂他在說明的是，戰略上跟作戰層級上脫鉤導致失敗，
: 還想要解釋成是"戰術沒有執行得更完美，導致作戰層級境界不夠"的方向。
:
: The degradation of the political-military relationship within Germany was an: inherent problem for blitzkrieg in that the link back to the strategic level: was severed once protracted war began.
:
:
: : 如果使用得當，閃電戰可以執行目標，同時允許戰地指揮官靈活地利用當地情況和環境，
: : 當政治驅動的戰略尋求全面的征服和敵人的消耗時，《閃電戰》被迫面對其創造者未曾預
: : 想到的局面，以一種不符合其預期作用的方式使用時，閃電戰失敗了，導致意想不到的後
: : 果。
: : 這個教訓可以也應該適用於當代系統的規劃者和領導者考慮的業務計劃和他們的實現。閃
: : 電戰作為一種作戰系統提供了洞察靈活的價值學說、軍事文化和作戰計劃。
: 所以他到最後說的已經不是你熟悉的那個戰術上的閃電戰，
: 而是作為一個"作戰層級"思考模式的。
:
本文的結論

Blitzkrieg was an effective operational system, designed and intended to wageshort-duration wars against similarly structured and equipped enemies.
However, it became ineffective when German military planners failed to adapt
their doctrine and strategies to accommodate their government’s
ever-increasing demands for employing military forces without a coherent
overarching strategic concept.

閃電戰是一種有效的作戰體系，其設計和目的是針對結構和裝備相似的敵人進行短期戰爭。然而，當德國軍事策劃者未能調整其戰略與戰術，以適應政府不斷增長的軍事需求，而這些需求缺乏一致的整體戰略構想時，閃電戰便變得無效。

請問這段跟我說的"隨著戰爭的進行，德國軍隊沒能調整他們的體制，無法改變其軍事組織
模式，也沒有對他們的戰爭方式進行改革和現代化，這導致德國無法擊敗了英國、蘇聯和美國的軍事優勢"有啥不同?

本文第33頁是怎樣講的?
The eventual failure of the Blitzkrieg system cannot be attributed to any
single commander or event. Although many scholars argue that Hitler or the
Russian campaigns explain its downfall, the root cause may lie in what Dö
rner refers to as the Logic of Failure.

閃電戰體系的最終失敗，不能歸因於某位特定指揮官或單一事件。儘管許多學者認為希特勒或俄羅斯戰役是其失敗的原因，但問題的根源或許正如迪納所說的「失敗的邏輯」
-意思就是德國的整個體系沒有隨戰爭的長期化而調整。

本文的第30頁是怎樣講的:
Dr. Schneider’s last two conditions are characterized as strategic
requirements: nations having the capacity to wage war and continuous
mobilization. The subversive nature in which the German industrial
preparations
germane to this monograph. However, it cannot be contended that Germany
readied
socially, and militarily for war.

施耐德博士提出的最後兩個條件被定義為戰略需求：國家發動戰爭的能力以及持續動員的能力。德國在《凡爾賽條約》下進行的工業準備，其隱蔽性與本專論無關。然而，不可否認的是，德國在政治、社會和軍事方面並未做好充分的戰爭準備。

不管是《德軍的神話與現實》還是M.奇蒂諾在《國防軍-節節敗退，1943年失敗的戰爭》裡都提到德軍的機動戰"已死"，比如《德軍的神話與現實》提到當機動戰失效時，德軍無法把它的體系轉換成消耗戰；M.奇蒂諾還提到德國戰略的困境。

M.奇蒂諾在前言的第八頁提到20世紀的工業化戰爭，是國家、政治制度與經濟的較量，已經不是軍事文化間的單純對決，所以你一直提到閃電戰的失敗來自作戰階層與戰略脫鉤，這種純軍事面的看法，是否狹隘?我對閃電戰的失敗解釋是否更為寬廣?

: Much of the value of this monograph lies with to those in leadership
: positions that interface with the political dimension of war.
: Utilized appropriately, blitzkrieg met operational objectives while allowing: field commanders the flexibility to exploit local situations and
: circumstances.
:
: 你沒翻的地方就是，該文自認為價值是在，
: 要考慮到戰爭政治面的領導那個層級。
:
: 所以是從那個層級往下看閃擊戰這概念能怎麼用，
: 而不是從軍隊角度看我們怎麼執行完美的閃擊戰。
:
:

我真的沒看出此文在哪邊跟政治面有關，也看不出它能對政戰爭的規劃者有啥幫助。

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